Mercer Law Review
Volume 48
Number 3 Articles Edition

Article 13

5-1997

United States v. Armstrong: Permissible Prosecutorial Discretion?
Robert C. Brand

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Brand, Robert C. (1997) "United States v. Armstrong: Permissible Prosecutorial Discretion?," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 48 : No. 3 , Article 13.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol48/iss3/13

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

United States v. Armstrong: Permissible
Prosecutorial Discretion?

In United States v. Armstrong,' the Supreme Court explicitly set forth
the threshold requirement the defendant must meet in order to be
entitled to discovery on a selective prosecution claim. There must be a
credible showing that similarly situated persons of other races could
have been prosecuted, but were not.2
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In April 1992, respondents, all black men, were indicted on crack
cocaine and federal firearms charges.' Respondents filed a motion for
discovery, or for dismissal, alleging they were the targets of selective
prosecution based on their race." In support of their motion, they
produced an affidavit indicating that all twenty-four crack cocaine cases
closed in 1991 by the federal public defender's office in Los Angeles
involved black defendants. 5 The government opposed the discovery
motion alleging that the affidavit was insufficient because it did not
show that defendants who were not black were not prosecuted.' The
district court granted respondents' motion and ordered the government
to provide detailed discovery on the selective prosecution claim.7

1. 116 S,Ct. 1480 (1996).
2. Id. at 1489.
3. Id. at 1483 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (1988)). Section 841 provides that "it shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or [tlo possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841. Section 846 provides that any person who conspires to
commit an offense, such as described in § 846, "shall be subject to the same penalties as
those prescribed for the offense." 21 U.S.C. § 846.
4. 116 S. Ct. at 1483.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1484.
7. Id. The district court's order instructed the government to provide the following
material: (1) a list of all cases from the last three years in which the government charged
both cocaine and firearms offenses, (2) identification of the race of the defendants in those
cases, (3) identification of the levels of law enforcement involved in the investigations of
the cases, and (4) an explanation of the criteria used for deciding to prosecute those
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The government moved for reconsideration, providing the court with
the alleged facts of the criminal charge and a report indicating the
manufacture and distribution of crack is controlled in part by black
street gangs.' Respondents supplemented their original offer with
evidence that both black and white people use crack cocaine and that
there are white persons prosecuted for crack offenses in state courts.9
The district court denied the motion to reconsider and dismissed the case
when the government indicated that it would not comply with the
discovery order.'0
A three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
order and held that the defendants must provide a colorable basis for
believing that other similarly situated persons have not been prosecuted
in order to be entitled to discovery." Upon a rehearing en banc, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order of dismissal holding that
a defendant is not required to demonstrate that the government has
failed to prosecute similarly situated persons as long as some evidence
of selective prosecution is shown.' 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriate
showing a defendant must make in order to compel the government to
provide discovery on a selective prosecution claim.13 In reversing the
en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that in order to
compel discovery a defendant must meet the threshold requirement of
a credible
showing of different treatment of similarly situated per14
sons.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for the law on selective
prosecution in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 5 In that case, petitioners challenged a local ordinance" granting licensing discretion to the board of

defendants for federal cocaine offenses. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.

Respondents submitted an affidavit by an intake coordinator at a drug

treatment center alleging that there were equal numbers of caucasian and minority drug
users and dealers. They also submitted an affidavit from a federal criminal defense
attorney stating that many nonblack persons were prosecuted in state court for crack
offenses. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1484-85.
13. Id. at 1485.
14. Id. at 1489.
15. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16. Id. at 356. The ordinance provided as follows:
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supervisors on equal protection grounds, alleging that all two hundred
Chinese applications for laundry licenses were denied while all but one
of the eighty Caucasian applications were approved. 7 In deciding that
petitioners' rights had been violated, the Supreme Court reasoned that
a certain amount of discretion in the administration of the law was
acceptable.'" However, the exercise of discretion "directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons.., administered ... with an evil
eye and an unequal hand" is not constitutionally permissible.19
The Supreme Court further defined permissible prosecutorial
discretion in Oyler v. Boles.2" There, petitioners alleged a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection violation in that they were discriminated
against as habitual criminals and sentenced to life imprisonment when
five other persons, who were subject to sentencing under the habitual
criminal statute,' were not sentenced under it.' In disagreeing with
petitioners' equal protection claim the Court stated, "[Tihe conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case might
imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard .... '
In United States v. Berrios,24 the Second Circuit developed a frequently cited formulation for the defense of selective prosecution. After
describing the defendant's burden as a heavy one, the court found that
a defendant must produce prima facie evidence that similarly situated
persons were not prosecuted and that the government's charging decision
was invidious or in bad faith.2 5 In order to compel discovery on

It shall be unlawful from and after the passage of this order, for any person or
persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry, within the corporate limits
of the city and county of San Francisco, without having first obtained the consent
of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed
either of brick or stone.

Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 370.

Id. at 373-74.
368 U.S. 448 (1962).
21. Id. at 449 (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 6130, 6131 (1961)). Section 6130 provided "for
a mandatory life sentence upon the third conviction of a crime punishable by confinement
in a penitentiary." W. VA. CODE § 6130. Section 6131 provided the penalty would be
"invoked by an information filed by the prosecuting attorney immediately upon conviction
and before sentence." Id. § 6131.
22. 368 U.S. at 454-55.
23. Id. at 506.
24. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 1211.
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selective prosecution, the court found that a colorable basis must exist
for the claim.26 There must be some evidence tending to show that the
essential elements of the defense exist and that the requested documents
would be probative of the claim.27 Despite its belief that neither
standard was met in the case, the court of appeals found the district
court had not abused its discretion in finding a prima facie case of
m
selective prosecution."
In Wayte v. United States,29 the Supreme Court confirmed that
selective prosecution claims were appropriately judged by ordinary
standards of equal protection."0 Thus, in order to maintain a claim of
selective prosecution, a defendant would have to show both a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose behind the prosecutorial
scheme."
However, the Court specifically declined to answer the
question the dissent viewed as crucial; the standard by which the
prosecution could be compelled to provide discovery on the issue of
selective prosecution. 2 The dissent argued that a defendant need not
make out a prima facie case in order to compel discovery.3 3 Instead, a
defendant would have to make a nonfrivolous showing on the selective
prosecution claim before discovery would -be compelled from the
prosecution. 4
The federal circuits have not been uniform regarding the burden a
defendant must meet to compel discovery on selective prosecution.35
Some circuits require a heavy burden of a prima facie showing of
selective prosecution before discovery is required. 3 Other circuits have
adopted the standard of a nonfrivolous showing of the elements of

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1211-12 (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 177, 181 (3d Cir.
1973)).
28. Id. at 1212.
29. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
30. Id. at 608.
31. Id. To make out a prima facie case, Wayte must show, first, that he is a member
of a recognizable distinct class. Second, he must show that a disproportionate number of
this class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution. Third, he must show
that this selection procedure was subject to abuse or was otherwise not neutral. Id. (citing
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
32. Id. at 605 n.5. Wayte did not raise the claim before the Court, nor was the issue
argued or briefed. Id.
33. Id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1514 (9th Cir. 1995).
36. See United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 837 (1st Cir. 1990) (to overcome the threshold
presumption that the prosecution acted in good faith, the defendant must make a prima
facie showing of selective prosecution).
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selective prosecution. 7 Finally, some circuits have adopted a lower
burden of some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential
elements of selective prosecution. 8

III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

8
established the
The Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong"
threshold requirement of a credible showing of different treatment of
similarly situated persons before the government will be required to
comply with a discovery request regarding selective prosecution.4 In
setting this standard, the Court concluded that the "showing necessary
to obtain discovery should itself be a significant barrier to the litigation
of insubstantial claims."4
The primary rationale offered in support of the higher burden before
compelling discovery results from a respect for the separation of powers
between the judicial and executive branches of government and a
reluctance to subject prosecutorial charging decisions to judicial
scrutiny.4 2 Furthermore, doing so has several negative consequences.43 First, it delays criminal prosecutions." Second, law enforcement
efforts are hampered through scrutiny of the prosecutor's motives and
Third, revealing the government's enforcement policies
decisions.'
There are most
undermines the effectiveness of prosecutions."
certainly constitutional restraints on prosecutors.47 However, under
normal circumstances, as long as there is probable cause to believe a

37. United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant must
show a colorable entitlement that takes the question past the frivolous state and raises a
reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose); United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49,
52 (4th Cir. 1986) (a nonfrivolous showing of both elements of the claim is sufficient to
support a hearing and related discovery).
38. Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1513 (the "high threshold" description of the colorable basis
standard is an artificially onerous burden); United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1158
(7th Cir. 1990) (colorable basis is coming forward with some evidence to support the charge
of selective prosecution).
39. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1489.
Id. at 1486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citingUnited States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)). See also Oyler

v. Boles, 368 U.S. at 456 (holding the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on

"an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification").
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violation of the law has occurred, "the decision whether or not to
prosecute ... generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion.' s
Despite lower courts' failure to address the issue, the Supreme Court
also concluded that discovery on selective prosecution is not required by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 10 9 Although Rule 16 allows for
discovery of material within the government's possession that is
"material to the preparation of the defendant's defense,' 5° the Court
found that selective prosecution claims were not covered because such
claims are not defenses within the meaning of the rule.5 They are
assertions that the charges have been brought for reasons forbidden by
the Constitution.2 The concurrence argued that selective prosecution
claims were defenses contemplated by the rule because such defenses
can take differing forms. 3 Finding that the rule would authorize
discovery in an appropriate case, Justice Breyer found the standard of
materiality to defendant's defense was not met here because there was
no clear evidence of selective prosecution on these facts."4
The primary infirmity in respondents' allegation of selective prosecution in this case was that there was no showing that similarly situated
persons of different races were not prosecuted.5 5 Respondents' study
indicated only that the persons who were prosecuted were black.' It
did not indicate that nonblack persons were not prosecuted.5 7 Reasoning that, by definition, selective prosecution means that some type of
selection has occurred, the Court rejected the lower court's decision that

48. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)).
49. Id. at 1485 (citing FED R. CRIM. P. 16(aXIXC)). Rule 16 states, in relevant part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government
as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(aXl)(C).
50. Id.
51. 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1490 (Breyer, J., concurring). "A defendant's defense can take many forms,
including (1) a simple response to the Government's case-in-chief, (2) an affirmative defense
unrelated to the merits.... (3) an unrelated claim of constitutional right, (4) a foreseeable
surrebuttal to a likely Government rebuttal, and others." Id.
54. Id. at 1491 (Breyer, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1489.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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defendant need not show that similarly situated persons of other races
were not prosecuted.5
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The primary effect the decision in United States v. Armstrong59 will
have on selective prosecution claims will be on the type and sufficiency
of evidence necessary to prove the claim. No longer will simply showing
that, for example, only black persons were prosecuted for a particular
type of crime be sufficient.6' The new standard requires at least some
evidence creating a credible showing that nonblack persons could have
been prosecuted, but were not.6" Furthermore, simply relying on the
general entitlement to discovery in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16 is no longer sufficient. 2 Courts are no longer permitted to consider
selective prosecution claims as defenses within the meaning of the
rule.63
Critics of a higher burden for the entitlement to discovery point out
that defendants face difficult evidentiary obstacles in making their
selective prosecution claims because the evidence they need is often in
the hands of the prosecutor.6 4 Some have advocated a system where
judicial notice of similarly situated persons who were not prosecuted
could be established.65 However, this turns the presumption of
prosecutorial good faith on its head and removes from the defendant the
burden of making at least a credible showing that there is some evidence
of selective prosecution."
The decision in Armstrong also recognizes that certain types of persons
are more likely to commit certain types of crimes.6 7 The Court criticized the court of appeals for presuming that people of all races commit
all types of crimes. 6 It cited a sentencing report that indicated that
certain types of people were in fact sentenced more frequently for certain

58. Id. at 1488.
59. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
60. Id.at 1489.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1485.
63. Id.
64. Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective ProsecutionClaims: Fulfilling
the Promise of Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043, 2067-68 (1996).
65. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 743 (4th Cir. 1996).
67. See 116 S. Ct. at 1488-89.
68. Id.
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types of crimes. 69 Some argue that the statistics only lend credence to
the existence of impermissible selective prosecution, 0 but the fact
remains that the statistics would not exist if there was not sufficient
evidence to convict the persons of the various categories of crimes.
Another important implication of the decision in Armstrong regards
the amount of discretion remaining with the district courts to order
discovery on selective prosecution. The Second Circuit, in United States
v. Al Jibori,71 has already considered the issue and found the holding
in Armstrong to seriously undermine the discretionary authority of the
district courts to order discovery.7" In fact, it was the Second Circuit
that established the discretionary power of the district courts to order
discovery in United States v. Berrios.7"
It is difficult to know the exact limitation the decision in Armstrong
will have on the district court's discretionary power to order discovery.
The majority did not indicate the standard of review it employed in
reaching its decision.74 However, at least arguably, the Second Circuit
was prophetic in its conclusion that district court discretion has been
undermined. In United States v. Olvis,7" the Fourth Circuit found that
because the Supreme Court had developed such rigorous requirements
before discovery on selective prosecution claims can be compelled, district
court orders on selective prosecution claims are reviewed de novo.7"
The court found the discovery orders were based on the legal adequacy
of the evidence and therefore appellate courts are not required to defer
to the discretion of the district courts.77
The decision in Olvis also noted significant obstacles in showing that
similarly situated persons of other races were not prosecuted. 7' The
district court had ruled that five white unindicted members of a cocaine'
conspiracy ring were similarly situated to the black indicted members of
the ring because they all had similar involvement in the criminal
enterprise. 79 However, the district court was reversed because it had

69. Id. (citing United States Sentencing Commission's 1994 Annual Report, indicating
that more than 90% of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack cocaine trafficking were
black, 93.4% of convicted LSD dealers were white, and 91% of those convicted for
pornography or prostitution were white).
70. See id. at 1494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. 90 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 25.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
97 F.3d 739 (1996).
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 744.
Id.
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focused only on the relative culpability of the persons in deciding they
were similarly situated."0 According to the three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit, defendants are similarly situated only when "their
circumstances present no distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors
that might justify making different prosecutorial decisions with respect
to them."8 ' In utilizing the variety of factors the Fourth Circuit found
relevant to determine whether a person is similarly situated for selective
prosecution purposes, 2 it would seem that the government could often
articulate factors leading to the conclusion that the individuals being
compared are not similarly situated.
ROBERT C. BRAND

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. A finding that the defendants are not similarly situated could be based on any
of the following factors: offers of immunity to defendants who are more cooperative, the
relative strength of the cases against the defendants, the fact that the defendant's role in
the crime could differ, the fact that a defendant may be facing prosecution by state or other
authorities, the defendant's candor and willingness to plead guilty, the amount of resources
required to prosecute a defendant may differ, the potential impact that a prosecution of a
particular defendant will have on other prosecutions, and the prosecutorial priorities for
prosecuting certain types of crimes. Id.

